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University of New Hampshire 
 Religious nationalism, defined as the integration of civic and religious identities, was a 
popular vehicle for national struggle in eastern European countries like Poland and Romania 
during the interwar period through Catholicism and Orthodoxy. While some countries experience 
strong religious nationalist movements, others appear to be weaker. This research uses the case 
study of the Ukrainian independence movement, which experienced attempts to meld the Greek 
Catholic identity with nationalist causes between 1918 and 1945, to test which factors are 
relevant in forming a religious nationalism. This research explores the ability and effectiveness 
of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian nationalist groups, such as the 
Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists, to bring about the synthesis of religious and political 
aims and create a religio-national identity. Ultimately, Ukraine failed to foment religious 
nationalism between 1918 and 1945 due to an inability to find successful cooperation between 
religious institutions and nationalist groups. Debates regarding secular or Christian groundings of 
the future Ukrainian state, the use of political violence and internal factionalism in both groups 
prevented the formation of a clear religio-national identity in Ukraine. Successful repression of 
the Ukrainian nationalist cause from occupying countries, such as Poland and the Soviet Union, 
prevented the movement from engaging in explicit and intensive cross-cooperation, ultimately 
failing when the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church dissolved in 1946. The failure to form a 
resonating religio-national identity in Ukraine may be a relevant factor in the fractured political 




I.  Introduction 
 
Background  
The tattered and fragmented formation of current Ukrainian nationalism, driven by a 
disputed series of foundation myths and a highly heterogeneous population, invites a further 
investigation. While many arguments regarding Ukrainian identity focus on political and ethnic 
origins, a notable spiritual component is lacking: the role of religious institutions. Religious 
institutions have historically intervened in the formation of nationalism, notably in the 
foundation of the Polish Catholic identity. Ukrainian religious nationalism is an integral 
component of identity-forming myth that is essential to achieving a well-rounded understanding 
of the current state of the Ukrainian identity. The phenomena of religious nationalism can be 
defined as the integration of national identities with a concurrent religious identity, thus inserting 
a faith-based connotation to the struggle for independent state formation. The primary vehicle for 
Ukrainian religious nationalism emerged through the Greek Catholic Church, popular in western 
Ukraine in the early 20th century during the series of Austria, Polish, and Soviet occupations. The 
destruction of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) in 1946, arranged at a meeting of 
Soviet officials and religious figures in L’viv, ushered a forceful end to a troublesome vector of 
anti-Communist resistance and Ukrainian national identity. Presently, Greek Catholics are only 
8-10% of the Ukrainian population despite their historical role as an incubator of nationalism.1 
The relevancy of the Greek Catholic’s role in harnessing Ukrainian religious nationalism is a 
notable factor in measuring whether a true religio-national identity was created between 1918 
and 1945.  
                                                           
1 “Europe – Ukraine”. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/up.html (accessed April 2, 2020).  
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Religious nationalism becomes particularly relevant given a strong cooperation between 
religious organizations and nationalist movements. The symbiosis between religious and 
nationalist groups allows for a shared political goal that inherits both a faith-based and patriotic 
struggle for existence. Juergensmeyer discusses multiple instances of religious nationalism such 
as Jewish Zionism in Israel, Islamic theocracy in Iran, and the divide between Catholicism and 
Protestantism in Northern Ireland.2 Barr uses the Malaysian case to discuss religious nationalism 
in Asia: through a dual program of ethno-nationalism and religious adherence, Malaysia adopted 
Islamization programs through education institutions to forge an Islamic-Malay identity.3 In 
Japan, Indegaard and Fukase-Indegaard argues that the unity between traditional religions such 
as Shintoism and the Meiji-era government allowed for an identity formation that supported the 
emergent Japanese state’s distinctive identity from the West and establish a state religion that 
lasted until the end of World War II.4 Toft and Zhukov observe the binary relationship between 
Islam and self-determination in the Russian Caucuses, as the Chechnyan rebels utilize their 
religious identification to justify a secession from the Russian state.5 
Christianity often became the source of religious nationalism in eastern European states. 
Loizides argues that the existence of autocephalous Orthodox churches in Bulgaria and Greece 
contributed to a 19th-century nationalist revival in which an alliance between political and 
religious institutions ascribed religious significance to ethnic and national existence.6 Guroian 
                                                           
2 Mark Juergensmeyer. "The global rise of religious nationalism." Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 
3 (2010): 262-273. 
3 Michael D. Barr, and Anantha Raman Govindasamy. "The Islamisation of Malaysia: Religious nationalism in the 
service of ethnonationalism." Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 3 (2010): 293-311. 
4 Fumiko Fukase-Indergaard and Michael Indergaard. "Religious nationalism and the making of the modern 
Japanese state." Theory and Society 37, no. 4 (2008): 343-374. 
5 Monica D. Toft, and Yuri M. Zhukov. "Islamists and nationalists: Rebel motivation and counterinsurgency in 
Russia's North Caucasus." American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (2015): 222-238. 
6 Neophytos G. Loizides. "Religious nationalism and adaptation in Southeast Europe." Nationalities Papers 37, no. 
2 (2009): 203-227. 
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presents the association between the Armenian Orthodox Church and Armenian nationalist 
groups through their twin formation of a national myth in the post-Soviet era.7 Johnston shows a 
complementary conclusion in a survey of Lithuanian Catholicism, given the connection between 
the church and Sajudis independence movement during the Soviet era: Lithuanian national 
identity became realized through the vehicle of the Catholic Church.8 These examples, all 
residing in formerly Soviet territory, are indicative of religious nationalism’s successful role 
when given a mutual and cooperative existence between the church and nationalist groups.  
The Ukrainian Question 
To further investigate the interplay between religious institutions and nationalist groups 
in the formation of religious nationalism, this research examines the case study of Ukraine 
between 1918 and 1945. In particular, this research focuses on the relationship between UGCC 
and Ukrainian nationalist groups in western Ukraine during this period. From 1918 to 1945, 
Ukrainians fought an intense struggle against Poland and the Soviet Union in the fight for 
national independence. This period contained the most forward outburst of nationalist energy in 
Ukraine since the Cossack revolts of 1648. It reveals the foray of Ukrainian religious institutions 
into political action toward the goal of national independence. Driven by an agitated nationalist 
base and an activist Greek Catholic clergy, western Ukraine sought to become the Piedmont of a 
Ukrainian Risorgimento: the leader that shapes the will of national unification. With the conquest 
of Ukraine by the Soviet Union following the Second World War, the nationalist project for 
independence dissipated.  
                                                           
7 Vigen Guroian. "Religion and Armenian national identity: Nationalism old and new." Occasional Papers on 
Religion in Eastern Europe 14, no. 2 (1994): 3-9.  




 The selection of Ukraine is justified through its uniquely problematic formation of 
national and religious identity. While neighboring states such as Romania9 and Poland10 formed 
a readily visible religious nationalism during the interwar and postwar era, the potentiality for 
Ukrainian religious nationalism remains an opaque and complex phenomenon. Ukraine’s 
particularly impotent nationalist and religious response to Soviet occupation during the postwar 
era (partially driven by strong Soviet repression), compared to the political energy of the Polish 
Catholic Church and Solidarity movement, is an indicator of differences between the degree of 
viability and sustenance of religious nationalism in the respective countries. Ukraine’s historical 
problem of national identity formation is compounded by its multidenominational Christian 
culture.11 Thus, examining the Ukrainian case study is worthwhile due to its ability to unveil the 
potential obstacles that appear in the formation of religious nationalism.  
Contribution 
 This research’s contribution is toward an understanding of if, and how, religious 
nationalism formed in Ukraine between 1918 to 1945. By considering the degree of religious 
nationalism in Ukraine during this period, it may be possible to identify a reason behind the 
continued struggle for Ukrainian national identity during the 2010’s. The relationship between 
UGCC and Ukrainian nationalist groups is vital in studying the interwar era of Ukrainian history 
due to its complexity and importance as the dominant religious-political partnership of the 
period. Analyzing the presence or absence of religious nationalism in interwar Ukraine is useful 
for future comparative studies with neighboring countries such as Poland or Romania, which 
                                                           
9 Radu Ioanid, “The sacralized politics of the Romanian Iron Guard.” Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions 5, no. 3 (2004): 419-453.  
10 Genevieve Zubrzycki, The crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and religion in post-communist Poland (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
11 Nikolai A. Kulinich, “Ukraine’s Russian Dilemma and Europe’s Evolving Geography.” In Ukraine: The search 
for a national identity, edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2000), 95-107.  
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assembled a definitive religio-national identity during the same era. This research also adds 
understanding to the generalized aspects required for the formation of religious nationalism, 
particularly in Christian contexts. With the discovery of the preconditions needed for religious 
nationalism, future scholarship may focus on these certain aspects in other case studies.  
Relevance 
 Ukraine’s multilayered identity formation in the postwar era under Soviet dominion is 
puzzling given the unique national identities forged in neighboring Soviet-era states.12 The 2013 
conflict in eastern Ukraine, emerging from the anti-Russian Euromaidan protest, signaled a 
regional divide regarding the nature of national identity: while western Ukrainians championed 
the continued propagation of independent and unified nationhood, eastern Ukrainians typically 
sought revanchism and realignment with its large ethnic Russian population (which was 
supplemented through Russian-sponsored population relocations to Ukraine). Supported by a 
Russian desire to protect their ethnic diaspora in Ukraine, the conflict began through a potential 
push to expand Russia’s sphere of influence and territory against an emergent pro-European 
Union segment in western Ukraine13. While the events of the War in Donbass occurred almost a 
century after the interwar struggles for Ukrainian independence, the period from 1918 to 1945 
formed a contextualization for regional and religious divides regarding the ethnic and national 
status of Ukraine. The support shown by UGCC for national independence in the immediate 
post-Soviet years, contrasted by the fragmented response of Orthodoxy to continued Russian 
relationships, is indicative of an extant religious tinge to understandings of Ukrainianism.14 By 
                                                           
12 Karina V. Korostelina. "Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine." Nationalities Papers 41, no. 2 (2013): 
296-300.  
13 For more information, visit https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia  
14 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 86-90.  
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tracing the religious and national divide to the interwar and World War II-era, this research 
examines the origins of the embattled Ukrainian identity in the present day.  
II. Literature Review 
 
Toward a Sociological Explanation  
Social identity theory, originating in sociological scholarship, asserts that religion and 
nationalism are expressive of humanity’s desire for grouping to ensure physical and 
psychological security, relying on social categorization for effectiveness. Beginning with the 
works of Tajfel, social identity theory states that groups are used to provide categorization to 
ensure self-security in a turbulent and uncertain world. Groups allow for uniformity of action 
between members and provide in-group bias formation to reward members and discriminate 
against outsiders. Individuals will internalize the group as their self-concept, connecting with 
other individuals with similar self-references to ensure solidarity and a group-based response to 
outside threats. Religious and nationalist groups are therefore examples of humanity’s socially 
rational response in providing self-security, moral boundary formation, and receiving social 
benefits prescribed within a certain group.15 Ysseldyk et al. adopts Tajfel’s social identity theory, 
arguing specifically that religious groups allow for closer bonding than civic groups due to the 
identification with eternal purpose, meaning, and philosophical pillars. Ysseldyk et al. claim that 
religious fundamentalists, utilizing discrimination and high-level ingroup rewarding, can 
combine claims of spiritual authority and morality with ethnic and nationalist considerations, 
fusing together a highly selective and powerful social group. Religious groups tend to unite to 
threats to group identity, intensifying social categorization to achieve greater group solidity.16 
                                                           
15 Henri Tajfel. "Social identity and intergroup behaviour." Information (International Social Science Council) 13, 
no. 2 (1974): 65-93. 
16 Renate Ysseldyk, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman. "Religiosity as identity: Toward an understanding of 
religion from a social identity perspective." Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (2010): 60-71. 
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 Tajfel’s influence is evident in the work of Seul, who describes religious groups as a tool 
for belonging and predictability of thought while reducing uncertainty and instability. Seul 
remarks that religion provides a collective purpose and a shared set of values and history. 
However, religion can be a motivator for intergroup conflict, given its intractable nature and 
ability to mobilize members to conduct effective collective action and violence. Seul states that 
religion is an “anchor” that sets self-identity into a worldview consistent with shared 
mythological or ritualistic considerations.17 Thus, religion is useful for rooting oneself in 
institutional membership to achieve self-security and actualization of worldviews and can be 
used for potentially violent means to achieve solidity and proliferation of values.  
 Religion as an “anchor”, utilized in Seul’s work, is a concept particularly useful in 
Furrow et al.’s argument that religion is a cornerstone of individual and group development. 
Despite focusing on youth development, the authors’ research is consistent with emergent group 
identification. Religion’s most potent force is shaping belief and moral codes within the group, 
providing cohesiveness and becoming the cornerstone of community development. Cooperation 
is expected as members seek similar group answers and spiritual connections through 
interactional boundaries expressed by the religion. Value creation and further development, both 
individually and within the group, is dependent on the “anchor” that the religion provides.18 
Oppong notes that religion becomes central to one’s personality and allows for unity of social 
circumstance within groups, allowing value acculturation to indicate group membership and 
                                                           
17 Jeffrey R. Seul. "Ours is the way of god': Religion, identity, and intergroup conflict." Journal of peace research 
36, no. 5 (1999): 553-569. 
18 James L. Furrow, Pamela Ebstyne King, and Krystal White. "Religion and positive youth development: Identity, 
meaning, and prosocial concerns." Applied Developmental Science 8, no. 1 (2004): 17-26. 
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assimilation. Religion becomes a value-based mechanism for identity formation in the author’s 
related conclusions.19  
 Expanding upon Furrow et al. and Seul’s proclamations of religion as an anchor, 
Kinnvall pinpoints periods of uncertainty as religion’s source of cohesion and identification as 
members seek to mitigate turmoil by attaching themselves to religious communities. Kinvall 
denotes religion as a “thick signifier” that allows community protection from insecure periods, 
such as foreign occupation and domestic turmoil. Believing identities are socially constructed, 
Kinnvall notes that groups tend to maximize similarities to achieve emotional unification. 
Groups thus form “we-images” that abhor strangers, dehumanize outsiders, and surround 
members with a sanctified privilege. Kinnvall argues that groups often mythologize historical 
traumas or glories to reinforce cohesion, kindred to the growth of national identity.20 Hogg et al. 
concur with Kinnvall’s adoption of uncertainty-identity theory, arguing that religion provides 
group security for members to empower collective identification and allow for internal 
stereotyping to achieve a standard set of norms and values. Religion establishes normative 
practices and reduces existential uncertainty, given the promise of a definitive afterlife. Like 
others, Hogg et al. believes religion is a useful anchor during uncertain times by giving a 
structured and strong collective identity. Bonding occurs within the community due to the 
rigidity and impermeability of religious worldviews.21 The arguments given by Hogg et al. and 
Kinnvall invoke rational action, as the authors believe individuals choose to construct group-
based identities during uncertain periods to reduce their individual existential insecurity. Hogg et 
                                                           
19 Steward H. Oppong. "Religion and identity." American International Journal of Contemporary Research 3, no. 6 
(2013): 10-16. 
20 Catarina Kinnvall. "Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, identity, and the search for ontological 
security." Political psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741-767. 
21 Michael A. Hogg, Janice R. Adelman, and Robert D. Blagg. "Religion in the face of uncertainty: An uncertainty-
identity theory account of religiousness." Personality and social psychology review 14, no. 1 (2010): 72-83. 
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al.’s arguments imply that religion could possess a role in crafting national identity following 
independence, given the uncertainty and typical weakness of initial post-independence 
governance.  
 Within the uncertainty-identity theory lies Sheikh’s argument that sacred values form 
within religious groups, transitioning secular and temporal issues into religious issues, during 
such tumultuous periods. When under a great threat, religious groups can “religionalize” political 
issues due to their strength as a group identity, attaching religious connotations to otherwise non-
spiritual matters. With this, religious groups become active within the political realm to defend 
sacred values and advocate for their interests. Certain political issues, such as independence and 
self-determination, can become imbued with religious symbolism as it becomes a sacred value. 
Sheikh’s argument helps explain the linkage between religious belief and political activism.22 
Through the lens of social identity theory, one can next examine the phenomena of religious 
nationalism in the Enlightenment era.  
Religious Nationalism  
 Religious nationalism relies upon shared faith, customs, nationhood, and values within a 
group. Hobsbawm’s analysis of “tradition” reveals the tendency to invent, reshape, or realign 
historical communal values to fit upon a modern standard within such groups. Through this 
connection to a perceived shared history, groups may connect their practices and conventions, 
imposed by repetition, to an ancestral origin. The use of invented traditions is found in their 
ability to enforce social cohesion, legitimize institutions, and allow value socialization to 
supplement group identity.23 Anderson emphasizes the use of propaganda and literature that 
                                                           
22 Hammad Sheikh, Jeremy Ginges, Alin Coman, and Scott Atran. "Religion, group threat and sacred values." 
Judgment and Decision Making 7, no. 2 (2012): 110-118.  
23 Eric J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger. The Invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
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allow for myths and traditions to proliferate throughout certain communities, thus allowing for 
groups to gain membership and solidify a shared identity through contact with such myths. 
Nationalism typically begins, in Anderson’s understanding, through the impersonal spread of 
group-images of fellow countrymen through identification with a common origin, culture, and 
value system.24 The shared myth and tradition are essential for the sprouting of religious 
nationalism.  
 Brubaker expands upon this basis by identifying the three main outcomes of nationalist 
thought. Firstly, a group receives a common identifier through a shared name and organization. 
Social organizations are created through the construction of institutional systems, which offer 
moral and cultural templates for followers to adopt. Lastly, framing events with preconceived 
worldviews and specifications allows for the politicization of certain occurrences. The usage of 
religion by a nationalist group strengthens these bonds and outcomes by tying ideas of destiny, 
morality, and finality to their action.25 Friedland builds notes that religious nationalism turns 
political action into a religious obligation, providing notions of immediacy and conclusively to 
group activity. Institutions become blended, as religious groups begin to accumulate power 
within political contexts.26 This recipe allows for religious-imbued nationalism through group 
cohesivity and feelings of shared destiny.  
 To understand the growth of religious nationalism, Rieffer expands these concepts by 
discussing the conditions that allow for the occurrence of religious nationalism. Formation only 
occurs when there is homogeneity of religion within the group population, a connection to a 
                                                           
24 Benedict Anderson. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso books, 
2006. 
25 Rogers Brubaker. "Religion and nationalism: Four approaches." Nations and nationalism 18, no. 1 (2012): 2-20. 
26 Roger Friedland. "Religious nationalism and the problem of collective representation." Annual Review of 
Sociology 27, no. 1 (2001): 125-152. 
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physical location such as land or territory, a need to protect from threats to either the religion or 
country, and the required formation of a group identity to counteract the presence of other 
nationalist organizations that threaten the structure or lifestyle of the group.27 Spohn notes that 
religious nationalism tends to occur as a reaction to encroaching secularism within a state or 
culture, finding particular potency if such secularism disrupts the existence of a traditionally and 
predominately religious society. Spohn states that religious nationalism is a transitory phase 
during the process of state formation and nation-building, in which civil identities attempt to 
overpower religious identities.28 The struggle between secularism and religion in a traditional 
society causes groups to embrace their religious heritage to block the erosion of their spiritual 
bonds.  
 In conjunction with social identity theory, Friedland advocates for an institutional 
analysis that evaluates the conditions that enable religious nationalists to engage in social and 
political action. Friedland shows that religious nationalism assimilates into the institutional 
capacities of the state, thus causing the state to act in accordance to the religious and social 
narratives pursued by the nationalist group. Religious nationalists may bond to their secular 
political counterparts by incorporating religious narratives, morality formation, and assigning a 
level of sacredness to the existence of the state.29 Thus, Mihelj concludes that secular and 
religious nationalism may align toward a compatible goal by intertwining their respective myths 
and symbols to serve a common purpose. This alliance may only occur if both types of 
                                                           
27 Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer. "Religion and nationalism: Understanding the consequences of a complex relationship." 
Ethnicities 3, no. 2 (2003): 215-242. 
28 Willfried Spohn. "Multiple modernity, nationalism and religion: a global perspective." Current sociology 51, no. 
3-4 (2003): 265-286. 
29 Roger Friedland. "When God walks in history: the institutional politics of religious nationalism." International 
Sociology 14, no. 3 (1999): 301-319. 
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nationalism can reconcile any spiritual or political differences, as they tend to be exclusionary 
forms of expression.30  
 The melding of religious nationalism toward secular goals is characterized by Johnston as 
a “religio-oppositional subculture”. Opposition groups, using the strong signifier of religion as a 
unifying tool, blossom under repressive regimes. These groups tie religious symbolism with 
dissident politics, aimed at attacking occupational governments and tending toward a goal of 
state secession. Johnson describes the usage of Catholic symbolism in the Polish independence 
movement during the Soviet era. To achieve a socialized community of dissidents, the religio-
oppositional subculture permeates throughout familial relations and educational institutions to 
create organic organizational structures, leadership training, and resources that allow for a 
continuous and growing stream of recruits.31 Johnston adds that religio-nationalist subcultures 
emerge under conditions by which religious institutions are granted special privileges outside the 
purview of the state, have a historic bind to an ethnic or patriotic group, and can offer the 
institutional protections that allow such movements to avoid direct initial repression.32 Factors 
such as state restrictions on religious institutions or the degree in which a religious institution is 
cooperative with the associated regime can diminish the effectiveness of religio-nationalist 
subcultures.  
Ethno-symbolist theorists believe that dualistic religious and ethnic identities are 
strongest and allow for the formation of a national destiny of kindred peoples, furthering a forged 
identity. Smith defines ethno-symbolism as “cultural and symbolic elements of ethnicity in terms 
                                                           
30 Sabina Mihelj. "‘Faith in nation comes in different guises’: modernist versions of religious nationalism." Nations 
and nationalism 13, no. 2 (2007): 265-284. 
31 Hank Johnston. "Toward an explanation of Church opposition to authoritarian regimes: religio-oppositional 
subcultures in Poland and Catalonia." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1989): 493-508. 
32 Hank Johnston. "Religio-nationalist subcultures under the communists: Comparisons from the Baltics, 
Transcaucasia and Ukraine." Sociology of Religion 54, no. 3 (1993): 237-255. 
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of its components of myth, memory, symbol, value, and tradition”.33 Ethnic groups combine their 
identity with religious beliefs, crafting a woven common history and moral framework that are 
propagated throughout the community. Such an identification will often fuse national identity 
with religious convictions, forming a powerful community force that binds ethnic group 
members politically. Cauthen argues that the unification of a certain religion with an ethnic 
group allows for the “myth of the elect” to form, in which the group perceives itself as pre-
ordained for a destiny and collective purpose. This is typically unified with national identity, 
seeking to further the group’s cultural survival and continuity through a unified spirit and 
temporal agent of a state. The group may seek to defend or reclaim a perceived sacred homeland, 
which is the geographic center of the ethno-symbolic dogma.34 Cultural groups can be imbued 
with a sense of collective purpose, particularly nationalism, given the presence of a spiritual 
bond.  
 Ethno-symbolic theorists both approve and challenge Cauthen’s claims. Leustean furthers 
Cauthen’s argument by claiming that an eternal relationship exists between religious institutions 
and nations, even if the nation is secular. While Cauthen relies on ethnic bonds, Leustean 
believes myths and symbols can unify spiritual and temporal institutions solely. Religion 
provides the behavioral framework for the nation by granting a societal vision and participatory 
role for its peoples. Ethno-symbolic nationalism is a joint program between nation and church to 
bind a common ancestry, community, and faith together.35 Both nation and faith can jointly use 
similar myths and symbols, crafting an everyday reality influenced by religious values.  
                                                           
33 Anthony Smith. “Ethnosymbolism.” In The Wiley Blackwell encyclopedia of race, ethnicity, and nationalism, 
edited by John Stone, Rutledge M. Dennis, Polly Rizova, Anthony Smith, and Xiaoshuo Hou (Wiley Blackwell, 
2016), 784-785.  
34 Bruce Cauthen. "Covenant and continuity: ethno‐symbolism and the myth of divine election." Nations and 
nationalism 10, no. 1‐2 (2004): 19-33. 
35 Lucian Leustean. "Towards an integrative theory of religion and politics." Method & Theory in the Study of 
Religion 17, no. 4 (2005): 364-381. 
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However, Safran challenges both Cauthen and Leustean by stating that language, rather than 
religion, forges with ethnic identity to form a national destiny for peoples. Safran argues that 
religion is an initial unifier of ethnic groups, and previously crafted proto-national identities 
during the medieval era. Post-Renaissance humanist thought disavowed spiritual unification, 
focusing on language as a signifier of common peoples across religious faiths. Noting the role of 
the printing press as a spreader of common languages, thus formulating national identities and 
eventually rallying unification efforts in several countries, Safran concludes that language is the 
foundation of national bonds in the civic-minded world.36 Agreeing on the unifying nature of 
religion for culturally similar peoples, Safran and Cauthen diverge in religion’s capacity for 
nation-state formation.  
 Disruption in the fusion of religious and national identities is described by Gentile as the 
byproduct of the political realm manifesting a civic religiosity that conflicts with traditional 
religiosity. Civic religions are a “metamorphosis of the sacred” toward the elevation of the state 
as the primary form of faithfulness and consecration. Nationalism’s use of ritual, symbolism, and 
dogmas replaces traditional religiosity as a new type of sacred mobilization. Gentile 
acknowledges that nationalism’s desire for actualized sovereignty lends sanctity to the state and 
attaches a divinity to martyrs that act toward the reification of the state. The “cult of the nation” 
overcomes traditional religiosity by creating moral and civic unity within nationalist 
organizations. Thus, Gentile ascribes nationalist movements as “political religions”.37  
 Political and traditional religions tend toward conflicts, even if both pursue the same goal 
of nationhood. Gentile describes the attributes of a political religion: the placement of the 
                                                           
36 William Safran. "Language, ethnicity and religion: a complex and persistent linkage." Nations and Nationalism 
14, no. 1 (2008): 171-190. 
37 Emilio Gentile. Politics as religion. (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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creation of a state above all religious considerations; a “code of commandments” that attaches 
ethical and moral law to the formation of the state; the community identifier of destiny within a 
body of common national identity; and a “political liturgy” which attaches divine revelation to 
the actions and goals of the nationalist movement. Traditional religion typically views political 
religions as competitors, seeking to divert people away from godly worship to a material and 
secular end. The religification of the state redirects the community toward humanistic goals that 
contend with the spiritual aspirations of the church. Gentile illustrates that nationalist groups, 
once in power, will intervene in educational institutions by polemizing secular concepts such as 
state and ethnicity away from the traditional religion’s curriculum. The deified state will require 
the church to become apolitical or will use religious institutions as forms of state control. Gentile 
characterizes this relationship through the dilution of the traditional religion’s principles with a 
syncretic and shared existence alongside the political religion. However, crisis occurs within the 
relationship if the traditional religion refuses to cooperate with the goals of the nationalist 
movement, thus making the partnership impotent.38 Religious nationalism relies upon the 
continued collaboration of both the political and traditional religion.  
Institutional Cooperation   
Institutional theorists claim that religious institutions shape political norms by framing 
morality, identity, and policy, thus crafting a symbiotic institutional relationship. Fox argues that 
religious institutions are of increasing importance as individuals embrace faith to counter 
alienation and disorientation from times of economic or political displacement, which tends to 
disrupt local cultures and practices. Through this, religion gains greater strength in policymaking 
as individuals and cultures maximize their faith, allowing for religious institutions to weave such 
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values into the temporal government. This pushes government decisionmakers to morally craft 
their policy decisions through religious identification, dually legitimizing themselves to the 
people through an attachment to a religious institution.39 Giannakos concurs with Fox, arguing 
that states tend to use religious beliefs for value and law formation. In return, churches 
subordinate to the state to not interfere in domestic matters or rival the state for control. This 
mutually dependent relationship allows the church to cater to the state’s needs while the state 
respects the influence of the church on the population. There is an institutional, rather than 
identity-based, partnership between the powers. Identity between the church and state is blended 
rather than separate. Giannakos utilizes evidence from southeastern Europe, discussing the usage 
of autocephalous Orthodox churches as rallying points for political independence and national 
identity movements in Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Such institutions consolidate independence 
movements by uniting political and religious passions.40 Both authors note that church and state 
institutions hold dualistic influence, shaping the actions of each other.  
 Kunovich echoes Fox and Giannakos, establishing that religion typically overlaps with 
national identity to influence institutional discourse and value formation. The author notes the 
intertwining identities perpetuated by interwar Italian fascists, combining heritage with Catholic 
faith. The crafting of a dualistic nation-faith identity allows for ready group mobilization, 
providing solidarity across spiritual and temporal lines. Religious institutions are useful in 
gathering resources and supplying leadership for nationalist movements to succeed. By 
combining the dominant religious group with a nationalist discourse, a greater group security 
status can be achieved as religious worshippers become united to the efforts to the state. 
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Institutionalists conclude that religious institutions hold tremendous sway over value and moral 
formations in political governance, thus influencing policymaking.41 Contrary to social identity 
theory, institutional theorists believe that religion has a structural influence rather than emanating 
from a purely individualistic and rational origin.  
III. Research Plan 
 
Research Question 
 The interwar era in Ukrainian history contained complex obstacles that constrained the 
ability of nationalists to achieve their goal of statehood. Primarily partitioned between Polish and 
Soviet control, Ukraine was a stateless entity during an era of self-determination and national 
revivals. Questions of ethnic and religious identities haunted the Ukrainian question, given the 
late emergence of the Ukrainian identity and lack of a unified definition. The boundaries of the 
future Ukrainian state, as defined by nationalists, held numerous ethnic minorities that contained 
Russophilic or pan-Slavic elements. The religious split between the Greek Catholics in western 
Ukraine and Orthodox-centric faiths in eastern Ukraine remained a sectarian issue that 
influenced political realities and identity formation across the proposed Ukrainian nation. 
Despite these challenges, Ukrainian nationalists were compelled to fuse the religious identities of 
their peoples within the framework of national realization. This research examines the interplay 
between Ukrainian nationalist groups with the Greek Catholic Church, which was the bastion of 
Ukrainian national identity during the prewar era. The following question is explored: what 
effect did the relationship between UGCC and nationalist groups have on the development of 
religio-nationalism in Ukraine from 1918 to 1945? From an analysis of this question, it will be 
possible to weigh the resonance of religious nationalism in Ukraine.  
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 If religious institutions and nationalist groups can synthesize  spiritual and political 
institutional goals, then religio-nationalism can form.  
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this hypothesis is religio-nationalism. Religio-nationalism is 
defined as the integration of national identities with a concurrent religious identity, thus inserting 
a faith-based connotation to the struggle for independent state formation. While religio-
nationalism cannot be quantitatively defined, it can be gauged through the usage of religious 
symbols and spirit in various nationalist literature and platforms. Religio-nationalism may also 
involve the active role of religious institutions in supporting nationalist groups, whether through 
political or material backing. The presence, or lack thereof, of a dualism between religion and 
national identity determines the formation of religio-nationalism.  
This research focuses on the relationship between the Greek Catholic Church and 
Ukrainian nationalists during the interwar era. The degree in which a religio-national identity 
was achieved during the interwar years is gauged qualitatively through the level of cooperation 
between the Church and Ukrainian nationalists. While the cooperation between the groups 
evolved during the interwar era, analysis of formative political events is used to determine the 
periods that best exemplify the progression of the Greek Catholic and Ukrainian nationalist 
relationship. It is important to note that some relationships may have remained private, and that 
disparate elements of each group may have rebuffed the public relationship between the Church 
and nationalists. Therefore, this relationship is not wholly monolithic, but is subject to the 
dominant narratives present. Additionally, it is possible that diasporic members of the Church 
were not accurately represented in the views of UGCC leadership.  
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Independent Variable  
 The independent variable in this relationship is the synthesis of religious and nationalist 
institutional goals in both the political and spiritual realm. This explores the degree of likeness 
granted to the ultimate goals of each group, which is used to judge the level of institutional 
cooperation. A high level of institutional synthesis is evident when both religious and nationalist 
groups subscribe to the same political and spiritual aims; for example, in areas such as 
nationhood and religious policy. This may also be evident if both groups sanction certain 
political activities and remain united in their responses to certain direct action undertaken by 
nationalists in the struggle for independence. A low level of institutional synthesis is reached 
when religious and nationalist groups cannot coalesce around the goal of nationhood or disavow 
the actions of their respective institutional partner. To judge this, the statements, reactions, and 
political activities of the Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian nationalists are evaluated for 
similarities in policy responses or action. The degree with which both institutions achieve 
likeness in political action determine the synthesis of their spiritual and political aims.  
Case Study  
 This research uses the case study of the relationship between UGCC and Ukrainian 
nationalists during the period of 1918 to 1945. Evidence from World War II-era actions is used 
to evaluate the effects of the relationship toward the goal of Ukrainian independence. Ukraine 
offers a unique example for the study of religio-nationalism due to the degree of political activity 
undertaken by the Greek Catholic Church in the pursuit of independence. The Greek Catholic 
Church is one of the few Eastern Catholic-rite churches operational within interwar eastern 
Europe, contrasted with the ubiquity of Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Protestant 
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denominations in other eastern Europe states. Therefore, the political viability of an Eastern 
Catholic religio-nationalism identity can be assessed.  
 Ukrainian nationalist groups present a curious case in eastern European national identity 
formation, given their challenge to bridge the multiethnic and pluralistic identities of the 
Ukrainians. The stateless peoples of Ukraine, divided primarily between Poland and the Soviet 
Union, provided a transnational foundation for the nationalist movement. Other nationalist 
organizations such as the Iron Guard in Romania had the convenience of an extant state and a 
mono-religious Orthodox citizenry to provide the foundations for a religio-national identity. 
Poland’s existing Catholic religio-national identity helped form the foundations for the Solidarity 
protest movement in the Soviet era. The question of religio-national identity in Ukraine helps 
explain the construction of the Ukrainian identity during their attempt at interwar independence, 
forming the basis for religion’s role within the postwar Ukrainian ethos.  
 IV. Case Study 
 
Introduction 
 National identity in postwar Ukraine, repressed by the Soviet Union and lacking any 
meaningful connection to legitimate religious institutions, can best be explained through a focus 
on the immediate post-World War I landscape. Ukraine’s division between Polish and Soviet 
rule in the interwar era incited an attempt at transnational unification within such spheres of 
influence. These efforts at nation-building, plagued by the lack of a normalized Ukrainian 
identity and the mosaic of political organizations with conflicting beliefs, failed to materialize an 
independent Ukrainian state. Despite the popularity of nationalistic self-determination 
movements in the post-World War I political landscape, resulting from the collapse and 
realignment of the Austro-Hungarians and German Reich, Ukrainians were not able to establish 
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an independent state. This research examines the relationship between the Greek Catholic 
Church and Ukrainian nationalist groups toward the goal of Ukrainian statehood during the 
interwar period. Investigating the organizational symbiosis of these groups within Ukraine 
allows for an understanding of the failure of Ukrainian nationalism to succeed in the interwar 
period.  
The institutional roots of Ukrainian Christianity began in 988 with the Baptism of Kiev 
by Prince Volodymyr. With support from the patriarch of Constantinople, Volodymyr introduced 
Orthodoxy as the primary state religion of the Kievan Rus’. The Baptism of Kiev initiated the 
spread of Orthodoxy, oppositional to the Roman Catholicism which had absorbed the 
neighboring Polish kingdom, as the dominant religion of the Slavic peoples. The decline of the 
Kievan Rus’ in the 13th century, primarily due to economic factors and the Mongol invasion, 
resulted in the transition of territorial authority to the rule of Polish and Lithuanian nobility. 
Polonization imbued the Kievan people with linguistic and cultural education that led to the 
growing attraction and acceptance of Polish rule by the subjects of Rus’. The Polonization 
process led to an increase in Catholicism throughout Volodymyr’s former lands, particularly in 
areas of western Ukraine that bordered closely to the heart of the Polish kingdom.42 This era, 
marked by the rising influence of Polish Catholicism and the deterioration of Orthodox political 
and cultural power in Ukraine, created the circumstances to allow the growth of the hybrid Greek 
Catholic religion to flourish in eastern European lands.  
 The process of Christianization in Ukraine allowed the Greek Catholic Church to emerge 
from the religious landscape following theological disputes. Ecumenical desires in eastern 
Europe between Catholicism and Orthodoxy led to the Union of Brest in 1596. The union 
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intended to fuse the denominations into a singular Christian identity under papal authority, while 
preserving Orthodox liturgy and rites. It received political support from Polish King Sigismund 
III due to its potentiality to pull Ukraine further into his country’s Catholic orbit. Orthodox 
nobility, particularly in eastern Ukraine, fought against the union and disrupted the ecumenical 
process, thus ending the prospects of Brest. Despite the victory of anti-union clergy, laity that 
remained pro-union (mostly in western Ukraine) sought the creation of a new Christian 
institution.43 The Greek Catholics, splintered from their Orthodox origins, forged a new religious 
identity.  
 During the 17th and 18th centuries, western Ukraine remained under the control of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Orthodox-centric Cossack Revolt (1648) failed to create 
an independent Ukrainian polity separate from Polish-Lithuanian rule; following the 
unsuccessful Revolt, many Orthodox churches in western Ukraine converted to Greek 
Catholicism. Meanwhile, eastern Ukraine gradually fell under the power of Muscovy, reaching 
the Peresiaslav Agreement (1654) and Eternal Peace (1686) to cede sovereignty as a counter to 
encroaching Polish-Lithuanian power. Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s realignment to the Moscow 
patriarchate in 1686 caused a decrease in its institutional power in western Ukraine as the 
Polonized Ukrainian elite adopted Greek Catholicism. Greek Catholicism’s unique combination 
of Roman loyalty and retainment of Orthodox practices blended into the western Ukrainian, and 
particularly Galician, culture. Much of western Ukraine’s Orthodox leadership migrated to the 
east, while Orthodox organizations such as the Stauropegial Brotherhood reformed to Greek 
Catholicism. 44 Western Ukraine solidified as a Greek Catholic stronghold as Orthodoxy 
weakened.  
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 Austria’s partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 ceded western 
Ukraine to the Catholic Habsburg rulers, creating the environment in which Ukrainian 
nationalism emerged. Initially, the Greek Catholics were treated as inferior subjects within 
Austria due to the religion’s popularity among Ukrainian serfs and absence of a trained clergy. 
However, the reigns of Empress Maria Theresa and Joseph II established the conditions for 
Ukrainian nationalism to emerge in Galicia. First, Maria Theresa granted Greek Catholicism 
equal protections similar to Roman Catholicism in 1774. Joseph II initiated educational 
investment projects for Galicia, creating seminaries and academies to train Greek Catholic 
priests. The metropolitan see in Galicia was established in 1808, granting prestige to the Greek 
Catholic religion.45 From these projects, a uniquely Ukrainian and Greek Catholic intelligentsia 
emerged that would propagate the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism in the coming decades. These 
groups would, in the coming decades, be influential in the formation of explicit political 
representation for ethnic Ukrainians following the 1848 revolution.  
 The 1848 revolution in Austria allowed Ukrainians, and the Greek Catholic Church, to 
became politically conscious and active throughout Galicia. The wave of democratic agitation 
throughout Habsburg lands resulted in the creation of the Supreme Ruthenian Council by Greek 
Catholic clergymen in 1848, which became the chief body for Ukrainian political activity. The 
Supreme Ruthenian Council was composed of thirty members selected from UGCC and the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia milieu. Ukrainians also gained a larger allotment of seats in the Austrian 
Reichstag. The newly educated Greek Catholic clergy engaged in political activism, lobbying for 
Ukrainian language education in Galicia. The presence of Poles in Galicia became a target for 
the Supreme Ruthenian Council, which rejected the diffusion of Polish cultural and religious 
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ideals among Ukrainians. The Greek Catholic clergy was explicitly anti-Polish, forging a 
particular identity in opposition to Poles: the Ukrainian national idea.46 The Habsburgs supported 
the Supreme Ruthenian Council’s attempts to de-Polonize Galicia, desiring a strong 
counterweight to growing Polish unrest in the province.47 Importantly, the Slavic Congress of 
1848 recognized Ukrainians as a nationality.48 Ukrainian Greek Catholics began to internalize 
emergent ideas of ethnic and cultural uniqueness as their political power within Austria increased 
and the threat of Polish cultural displacement grew.   
 UGCC became the primary distributor and curator of the Ukrainian national idea in the 
post-1848 political landscape. UGCC was the prime vehicle for educational activism for 
Ukrainianization in Galicia, integrating into local community levels through service projects and 
groups.49 Cultural societies and newspapers supported by UGCC proliferated such national ideas 
to urban areas and the educated populace.50 A stress on Ukrainian language education and the 
growth of Ukrainian-language publications crafted a linguistic-based nationalism among 
Galicians.51 The sons of UGCC priests formed the main figures of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as 
the church sought to spread their national ideals beyond religious communities into secular areas. 
However, the attempt of UGCC to reach Galician peasants stunted the growth of the Ukrainian 
ideal. Despite UGCC’s attempts to acculturate a Ukrainian identity among peasants, economic 
resentment overruled ideas of ethnic and cultural unity. Galician peasants did not typically 
engage in political action alongside the clergy due to class distinctions and economic disparity. 
                                                           
46 John-Paul Himka. "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772-1918." Harvard Ukrainian 
Studies 8, no. 3/4 (1984): 433-438.  
47 Alexander J Motyl. The turn to the right: the ideological origins and development of Ukrainian nationalism, 
1919-1929. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 6.  
48 Magosci, “Roots of Ukrainian nationalism”, 18.  
49 Himka, “The Greek Catholic Church”, 430-432.  
50 Taras Kuzio. "Ukrainian nationalism." Journal of Area Studies 2, no. 4 (1994): 87.   
51 Magocsi, “Roots of Ukrainian nationalism”, 22-23.  
25 
 
The persistence of Orthodoxy in the countryside and Russophile ideas prevented the Ukrainian 
identity from being fully realized.52 Ukrainian nationalism, advocated by religious figures and 
intelligentsia, remained a chiefly urban phenomenon.  
 However, secular segments of the Ukrainian intelligentsia replaced UGCC as the main 
proprietors of nationalism in the late 19th century. The socialist Ukrainian Radical Party, created 
in 1890, became the primary advocates for pan-Ukrainianism. Ukrainian students were the 
bulwark against Polish influence in institutions such as the University of L’viv. 53 Secular leaders 
found appeal among Ukrainians that religious figures could not achieve; instead, Ukrainian 
nationalism achieved an anticlerical and atheist flavor in the 1890’s due to secular antipathy 
directed at the church. UGCC, despite being the motivator for Ukrainian nationalism, fell to a 
newly secular and socialist aspect in Galicia.  
The Greek Catholic Church in Interwar Ukraine 
 This section argues that UGCC’s support of Christian patriotism and evangelical 
nationalism caused the lack of commonality with relevant Ukrainian nationalist organizations, 
inhibiting any synthesis of political aims in the interwar period. Andrey Sheptytsky’s ascension 
to UGCC leadership allowed the church to become a politically relevant player in Ukrainian 
nationalist circles. UGCC’s role in the 19th century as a nexus for ethno-genesis formation 
transformed by the advent of the 20th century into the religious advocate for statehood. However, 
UGCC’s inability to consolidate internal consistency around statehood aims and a conflicting 
relationship for primacy within the nationalist movement dissuaded any religio-national 
unification.   
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The failure of UGCC to direct the national movement in the 1890’s was rectified by the 
new leadership of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, serving from 1900 to 1944. Sheptytsky 
acknowledged the heritage of UGCC as a political vehicle for Ukrainian nationalism, choosing to 
use his position of Metropolitan to engage in political activism. Due to the multitude of national 
identifications and religious affiliates in Ukraine, Sheptytsky avoided the transformation of 
UGCC into a fully political organization to maintain a universalist stance toward his 
ideologically diverse laity and clergy. UGCC pursued an aspirational ecumenism with Ukrainian 
Orthodoxy, seeking to maintain a strong relationship without explicitly forming a national 
church. Sheptytsky believed a bond between UGCC and Ukrainian Orthodoxy could form a 
coherent national identity that disregarded confessional divides.54 However, Sheptytsky’s 
ecumenicism failed to emerge given Orthodoxy’s internal fragmentation between patriarchates in 
eastern Ukraine. Sheptytsky could not propogate UGCC throughout eastern Ukraine, given the 
geographical attachment of the Greek Catholics to Galicia and Orthodox suspicion of the spread 
of the faith. Lacking any eastern appeal, UGCC did not formulate a unified religious identity for 
Ukrainians.55 Religious identity divisions harmed Sheptytsky’s political allure in the east.  
 World War I and the subsequent Ukrainian War of Independence, which plagued Ukraine 
with violence from 1914 to 1921, resulted in a strategic transformation of the political program 
of UGCC.  During World War I, the Russian invasion of Austria resulted in a temporary 
occupation of Galician Ukraine. Ukraine, fighting in support of Austria against Russia, received 
punishment under their new sovereigns: Russian banned UGCC and dismantled its public 
operations in 1915 until Russia’s withdrawal from Austria in 1917. Following the chaotic 
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Ukrainian War of Independence and Bolshevik invasion, which divided Ukrainian territory 
between Poland and the Soviet Union at the Treaty of Riga (1921), UGCC recalibrated to 
confront the new political environment.56 Sheptytsky’s political efforts, which originally sought 
greater Ukrainian autonomy in Austria, now encountered the new rule of Poland. As western 
Ukraine fell to Poland at Riga, Sheptytsky adopted “Christian patriotism” with the explicit 
intention to achieve Ukrainian independence. The threat of Bolshevik Russia in eastern Ukraine 
caused UGCC to adopt a staunchly anti-Communist stance.57 Sheptytsky and UGCC, beyond 
their initial pursuit of a uniform Ukrainian identity, now became advocates for statehood.58  
 The Christian patriotism of Sheptytsky’s UGCC, in the pursuit of Ukrainian secession 
from Polish rule, achieved a distinct character. Sheptytsky advocated for evangelical rather than 
political nationalism, hoping to engage with nationalism through religious means rather than 
through electoral processes or political action. Political violence was explicitly disavowed due to 
UGCC’s desire to use religion as a method for nationalism.59 Christian patriots in UGCC denied 
forms of violence or terrorism against Polish authorities as effective methods of gaining 
popularity or growing Ukrainian political consciousness. Sheptytsky advocated for ethnic and 
religious tolerance within Ukrainian nationalism, believing that Orthodoxy and Russian elements 
within Ukraine could be allowed to operate in the movement. UGCC sought to proselytize 
nationalism in eastern Ukraine to create a transnational religious movement toward the formation 
of an independent state.60 Greek Catholic clergy members such as Avhustyn Voloshyn 
combatted Russophilic elements in the Transcarpathia and Bukovyna regions, showing UGCC’s 
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intent for inclusion amongst Ukrainian identities in the fight for statehood.61 Through this 
character of Christian patriotism, UGCC engaged in political activities against Polish occupation.  
 Possessing the cultural capital to sway the course of Ukrainian nationalism, UGCC cast 
the struggle against Poland as a peaceful endeavor. UGCC condemned all forms of terrorism 
against the Poles, as Sheptytsky urged his supporters to engage through a purely political 
process. With Vatican condemnation of the looming Communist threat, particularly referenced in 
Pope Pius XI’s Divini Redemptoris of 1937,62 Sheptytsky cast a more forgiving attitude to fellow 
Catholic Poles than atheistic Russians. However, this idealistic condemnation did not spread 
beyond verbiage; in the course of five months during 1930, thirty clerics were arrested on 
terrorism charges. UGCC began to openly cooperate with nationalist groups, such as the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). OUN, which pursued methods of direct action to 
combat Polish occupation, were responsible for many high-profile terror attacks against Polish 
government officials. Sheptytsky’s creation of the Ukrainian Catholic Union in 1931, a political 
organization meant to became a religiously nationalist party for the Ukrainians, collaborated with 
nationalist groups that engaged in violence.63 The formation of the Catholic Action of Ukrainian 
Youth in 1933, meant for the organization and education of young Greek Catholic Ukrainians 
toward the purposes of Ukrainian independence and nationalism, was headed by OUN leader 
Andriy Melnyk. Sheptytsky supported Plast, an organization which developed nationalist 
combatants for OUN. Despite Sheptytsky’s orations against political violence, UGCC found 
common cause with OUN and other nationalist organizations due to their similar goals of 
establishing an independent Ukrainian state and combatting the spread of Communism.64 
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 In conjunction with OUN, Sheptytsky positioned UGCC to become the champion of 
Ukrainian statehood during the beginnings of World War II. The failure of Molotov-Ribbentrop 
and expansion of World War II into eastern Europe allowed enough instability within Poland to 
enable the Ukrainian nationalists to pursue (nominal) independence. With UGCC support, the 
Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence was passed in the summer of 1941. UGCC, suing only 
for the idea of a Ukrainian state, did not endorse any further nationalist plans; Sheptytsky’s 
visions for a future state, such as an overtly Christian identity coupled with democratic 
institutions, clashed distinctly with the ideological pursuits of the nationalists.65 The breakdown 
of the OUN-UGCC relationship is further explored in the ‘Turbulent Relationships’ section of 
this research.  
 The inability to realize a synthesis of political goals between OUN and UGCC arose from 
incompatible positions within the Greek Catholic realm. Dissident voices existed within UGCC, 
often clashing with the Christian patriotism of Sheptytsky and the creeping incorporation of 
methods of political violence. Bishop Grygoriy Khomyshyn conflicted with his Ukrainian 
nationalist colleagues in the clergy, becoming the leader of Polish loyalist members of the 
church. Khomyshyn did not want the realization of Ukrainian nationhood, instead advocating for 
a peaceful coexistence with Polish authorities. The Ukrainian Catholic People’s Party, composed 
of Polish loyalist wings of UGCC political movements, became the main platform for 
Khomyshyn’s ideas to spread. Khomyshyn’s support of Ukrainian integration into the Polish 
state elicited strong condemnation from OUN and other nationalist organizations, often 
threatening the bishop with assassination.66 Despite UGCC’s profound support for independence, 
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the appeal of Khomyshyn’s political program negated any monolithic Greek Catholic promotion 
of nationalism.  
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Associated Groups  
 This section argues that OUN’s political actions harmed the attempt to synthesize religio-
national aims with UGCC. Arising from secular youth movements, Ukrainian nationalist groups 
emerged in an unorganized growth that caused a fractured nationalist front to develop. Using 
assassinations and political violence against opponents, OUN and the nationalist groups invited a 
Polish paramilitary crackdown. Disavowing political violence, UGCC represented the reformist 
wing of Ukrainian nationalism that clashed with the revolutionary tendencies of OUN. 
Therefore, OUN and UGCC did not have a coherent relationship during the interwar period due 
to their fundamental disagreements regarding methods of achieving statehood.  
Secular Ukrainian nationalist organizations emerged from the 1890’s turn toward 
youthful socialist political parties, opposed to the previous Greek Catholic iteration in the post-
1848 Austrian landscape. The creation of groups such as the Nationalist Ukrainian People’s 
Party in 1902 and Society of Ukrainian Progressives in 1908 furthered the cause of independence 
without the tether of religious affiliation. The Young Ukraine movement, championed by the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia, pursued a unification of the country and a removal of foreign 
occupants.67 Student-led protest groups, popular at the University of L’viv, imbued Ukrainian 
nationalism with a generational ethos. Primarily using literary circles and historical revisionism, 
Ukrainian political consciousness began to rise in universities. These groups dabbled in political 
violence, implicating themselves in the assassination of the Polish governor of Galicia Andrzej 
Potocki in 1909.68 From these roots, Ukrainian nationalists grew in prominence.  
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 The First World War and Ukrainian War of Independence formalized ideas of Ukrainian 
nationalism into a cohesive infrastructure that consisted of a paramilitary and literary wing. The 
Sich Shooters, a special Austrian military unit composed only of Ukrainian nationals, served 
alongside Habsburg forces beginning in 1914. The Sich Shooters incubated future Ukrainian 
nationalist military leaders such as Yevhen Konovalets and Andriy Melnyk. The ethnic 
organization of the Sich Shooters allowed for ideas of Ukrainian solidarity to proliferate, seeding 
the experience necessary for future military operations by nationalist groups. The Union for the 
Liberation of the Ukraine arose in 1914 to spread publications advocating for a distinct 
Ukrainian identity; however, the Union advocated for autonomy within the Austria, incapable of 
foreseeing the eventual loss of the Central Powers and dissolution of Habsburg lands.69 With the 
looming defeat of Austria, the Eastern Galicia uprising of November 1918 subverted Habsburg 
rule and established the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR). Despite briefly 
cooperating with the Directory, a separate political entity arising in eastern, Russian-controlled 
Ukraine, ZUNR endured several turnovers in political structure and succumbed to simultaneous 
Polish and Russian invasions.70 The brief taste of independence with the statehood of ZUNR 
gave western Ukrainian nationalists groups disdain for their Polish occupiers. From this, the 
nationalist movement would truly emerge.  
 The conquest of ZUNR by Poland in 1921 accelerated the growth and urgency of 
Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia. Five million Ukrainians now existed within the Polish state, 
composing the largest national minority.71 The repression of Ukrainian identity by the Polish 
government, through the Polonization of education and colonization of Galician lands, sparked 
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political violence. The Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) formed in 1920 for the distinct 
purpose of rebellion against Polish rule. Founded by Colonel Yevhen Konovalets, UVO made 
little attempt to engage politically with Poland. UVO exercised power through violent terrorism, 
attempting to assistance Polish Marshal Josef Piludski in 1921.72 Boycotts of the 1921 Polish 
census were supported by UVO. Over two thousand acts of sabotage, such as arson, were carried 
out by UVO in 1922, typically against symbols of the Polish state such as post offices. UVO 
were responsible for the assassination of Ukrainian writer Sydir Tverdokhlib in 1922 due to 
Tverdokhlib’s support for Ukrainian integration into the Polish state. The assassination of 
Tverdokhlib initiated a troubling trend among the UVO, who began to target Ukrainians deemed 
“treasonous” rather than the occupying Polish government.73 Tverdokhlib’s death led to the 
arrest of many key UVO members and an increase in Polish military suppression in Galicia.74 
Despite Polish efforts, UVO remained the key paramilitary organization advocating for 
independence.  
 Cracks began to emerge within UVO leadership following the 1922 Polish crackdown in 
Galicia. Iulian Holovinskyi, a UVO leader, was arrested by the Polish police. The exiled ZUNR 
condemned the political terrorism of UVO, advocating for a legal solution to independence. 
However, ZUNR disintegrated in 1923, unable to exercise a check on UVO actions.75 Having 
outlasted ZUNR, UVO became emboldened in pursuing direct action to end Polish occupation. 
UVO failed to assassinate Polish President Stanislaw Wojciechowski in 1924.76 Many 
Ukrainians, dissatisfied with the violent means of UVO, began to pursue political representation 
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in the Polish legislative body Sejm. The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO) formed 
in 1925 to pursue legal means of advocating for Ukrainian solidarity and interests. UNDO 
participated in Polish elections, gaining 23 Sejm members and eight Senators in the 1928 
elections. However, UNDO was targeted by UVO as gatekeepers who sought a reformation, 
rather than a revolution, of the existing political structure. Seeing no political solution to the 
plight of Ukrainians, UVO found little connection with UNDO.77 Other groups, such as the 
Ukrainian People’s Labor Party, failed to reconcile the moderate and radical factions of the 
Ukrainian nationalist movement.78 As Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia splintered, many 
intellectuals and leaders sought ways to coalesce and remedy the internal rivalries.  
 Amid the difficulty in maintaining a western connection in Galicia, the Ukrainian 
nationalist groups struggled to gather enough strength in the east. With pan-Ukrainian ambitions, 
focused on uniting the Polish-controlled west with the Soviet-controlled east, Ukrainian 
nationalist groups sought to consolidate support among their eastern allies. Initial 
Ukrainianization policies attempted to reify national consciousness and deepen the support for 
Communism within particular ethnicities during the 1920’s. The Soviets also encouraged 
Ukrainian language education throughout the Leninist regime.79 The birth of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1921, supported by the Soviets for its ability to weaken the 
strength of the Russian Orthodox Church and intended to allow religious independence for 
eastern Ukrainian Orthodoxy, quickly became a bastion for nationalism. The introduction of the 
Stalinist regime caused the quick destruction of the autocephalous church due to its nationalist 
activities, which included involvement in the Union for the Freedom of Ukraine group. The 
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Union worked for property restoration for religious organizations and allegedly sought to 
undermine Soviet rule. The group’s persecution as a secessionist movement eliminated many 
pro-independence intellectuals and politicians in eastern Ukraine.80 The reversals of 
Ukrainianization by Stalin stymied the growth of nationalism in eastern Ukraine due to the 
destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and repression of anti-Soviet 
agitation.  
 The horrendous humanitarian crisis of the Great Famine of 1932-33 devastated any 
attempts to mount a strong Ukrainian nationalist resistance against the Soviet Union, further 
hindering the ability of western Ukrainians to reach their eastern counterparts. The death of 
between five to seven million Ukrainians, coupled with the demoralization of the Ukrainian 
peasant, robbed any nationalist revolutionary potential from the countryside. Following the Great 
Famine, “millions left for the cities and any potential that rural areas once had for political 
mobilization disappeared”.81 The origins of the Great Famine and the intentions of the crisis are 
disputed by scholars, as some argue that it was not manufactured to directly affect Ukrainian 
nationalists. However, the eradication of millions of Ukrainian peasants uprooted any strong 
collective strength toward a nationalist revolt.82 Despite creating a casus belli for Ukrainian 
nationalists against the Soviet Union, the Great Famine contributed to the suppression of national 
fervor from the countryside. Without a potential partner in eastern Ukraine due to Soviet 
interference, the western Ukrainian nationalist groups could not source cross-border 
collaboration with an allied organization.  
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 The fragmented approaches and factions aimed toward achieving Ukrainian statehood 
failed to make a meaningful contribution to independence, thus necessitating an organizational 
realignment. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) formed in February 1929 during 
a summit in Vienna between the various parties within the nationalist movement. OUN 
committed to the use of terrorism to gather popular support against the Polish occupation.83 OUN 
drew its political philosophy from the works of Dmytro Dontsov, a committed Ukrainian 
nationalist. Dontsov advocated for an “active nationalism”, focusing on the necessity of power 
and struggle in the global contest of maintaining state sovereignty. Constructing Ukraine as a 
spiritually European race, composed in opposition to Russian civilization, Dontsov viewed 
Ukraine as a particular people that held a unique historical struggle for statehood.84 Dontsov’s 
Foundation of Our Politics praised the Catholic heritage of Ukraine, dismissing Orthodox 
counterparts due to their connection to Russia. This viewpoint gained the support of UGCC, 
which became a publisher of Dontsov’s works. Dontsov sought to meld Catholicism with 
Ukrainian nationalism, desiring a religio-national identity that could provide strong bonds 
between Ukrainians.85 Dontsov was a proponent of integral nationalism, believing that 
decentralized democratic institutions would work best in an independent Ukraine.86 With the 
theoretical backing of Dontsov, OUN organized for tangible political action.  
 The beginnings of OUN represented a stronger representation of Ukrainian nationalism 
within Poland. While UNDO disagreed with OUN’s support of terrorist tactics, they implicitly 
aligned with OUN through their mutual support of Ukrainian independence. OUN committed a 
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recorded 191 violent acts in cities where Ukrainians were the majority population, often 
attacking Polish property. OUN’s attacks on Polish property-owners initiated a further wave of 
arrests and Polish police repression. OUN responded to the increased Polish presence by 
orchestrating the assassination of Tadeusz Holowko, a deputy leader within the Sejm and 
policymaker of the repression campaign.87 In 1932, OUN assassinated Emilian Czechowski, the 
chief of police in L’viv.88 The wave of OUN assassinations reached a culmination with the June 
1934 assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki. Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior, was killed in 
Warsaw. The assassination of Pieracki began the most comprehensive Polish crackdown in 
Galicia, in which internment camps were formed to house 3,000 suspects involved with the cause 
of Ukrainian nationalism. The Polish government arrested over 800 OUN members, gutting the 
movement of its core constituency. Sheptytsky and Ukrainian emigres committed to the 
nationalist cause condemned OUN for their continued assassination campaign.89 The violence of 
OUN and resulting crackdowns in Galicia caused a faction of OUN supporters in 1935 to form 
Zov, an alternative organization. Zov’s leadership were all assassinated by OUN, causing Zov to 
disband quickly. The crackdowns in Galicia caused Colonel Konovalets to escape to western 
Europe. Konovalets was assassinated in Rotterdam in 1938. In total, OUN achieved 63 
assassinations between 1921 and 1939, of which only eleven were political figures and 52 were 
Polish collaborators (mostly Ukrainians). 90 The hopes of OUN were shattered by the end of the 
interwar period, having failed to create an independent Ukrainian state.  
Turbulent Relationships  
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 This section argues that the relationship between OUN and UGCC, arranged due to pure 
convenience against the mutual enemy of Communism, rested on a flawed philosophical 
foundation that suffered from political disagreements and violence. In attempting to create a 
national mythos, OUN and UGCC argued over secular or spiritual influence and primacy in 
forging a universal or Christian conception of Ukrainian statehood. OUN assassinations of 
UGCC-adjacent figures reignited harmful tension regarding political violence despite an 
intelligentsia-driven attempt to cultivate a faith-based nationalism. OUN and UGCC lacked the 
ability to synthesize political aims largely due to their philosophical differences and antagonistic 
political actions.  
UGCC and OUN attempted to cooperate during the interwar period to achieve their 
similar political aspirations. Sheptytsky believed a symbiotic relationship between religion and 
nationalism could be useful for realizing the goal of Ukrainian statehood. OUN’s nationalist 
outlook could operate diametrically and inspire opposition against Sheptytsky’s ultimate fear: the 
spread of Communism throughout Galicia. This convenient partnership between UGCC and 
OUN relied upon their antithetical beliefs toward Communism.91 Sheptytsky viewed the battle 
against Communism as a “cosmic battle” countering an atheistic and material political 
philosophy.92 With a paramilitary partner in OUN, Sheptytsky had the material forces to pursue 
his political platform.  
The turmoil of the UGCC and OUN relationship primarily lies with the disparate 
philosophical grounding of the religious and secular nationalist groups. OUN viewed the state as 
the highest unity and the focus of all revolutionary goals. Without the existence of the state, 
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Ukrainian identity could not be fully and authentically realized.93 Toward the end of obtaining 
the state, violence was explicitly endorsed by OUN. As the manifestation of the philosophy of 
Dontsov, OUN viewed itself as a political religion. With documents such as the “Ten 
Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist” and ceremonies involving vigils held at the 
tombstones of fallen comrades, OUN created a nationalistic mythos around the independence 
movement. Acts of terrorism, such as assassinations, were viewed as a path toward martyrdom.94 
OUN activist Dmytro Shtykalo stated that “nationalism requires faith in the nation, not in 
God”.95 The ethics of the nationalist movement emerged from secular positions to avoid internal 
religious disputes and acknowledge the positioning of material aspirations above spiritual 
considerations.96 OUN’s primary worship was not of God, but of the realization of political 
means through the Ukrainian state.  
 However, UGCC and OUN did not establish a friendly relationship during the interwar 
period. The use of political violence by OUN was bitterly met by Sheptytsky, who condemned 
the 1934 assassination spree that resulted in Minister Pieracki’s death. Through an understanding 
of Christianity’s nonaggression, Sheptytsky could not outright support OUN’s violence. The 
placement of UGCC inside of the nationalist conversation drew criticism from secular 
nationalists, who reviled the growth of the church’s influence. The formation of UGCC youth 
movements, which competed with OUN’s youth development programs, arose fears of a 
redirection of the emergent nationalist cohort toward religious matters. 97 Despite this, OUN 
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leader Andriy Melnyk became the leader of the Catholic Association of Ukrainian Youth.98 This 
coincided with Sheptytsky’s desire to reform OUN’s direction toward Catholic nationalism. 
Many religious and traditionalist Ukrainians lacked interest in the secular initiatives of OUN. 
The limited bandwidth of the nationalist movement, and the disagreement regarding the use of 
violence, caused clashes between the secular and religious movements struggling to achieve 
ideological supremacy.  
 The assassination of Ivan Babiy, the leader of the Organization for Catholic Action and 
the Ukrainian Academic Gymnasium, in 1934 by OUN forces caused the deepest fracture with 
UGCC. Babiy was targeted by OUN for supposed Polish sympathies, concurrent with OUN’s 
primary focus on ridding Ukraine of malcontent traitors to the independence movement. The 
position of Babiy within the Catholic organizational structure showed his adjacent role to UGCC 
interests. With the assassination of Babiy, OUN used fears of Polish collaboration to tread on the 
hierarchy of UGCC. Sheptytsky stated that Babiy “became the victim of Ukrainian terrorists, 
trembling horror shocked all people. Murdering for no reason, except because they did not like 
the educational activity of the deceased… the holy cause cannot be served with bloody hands.”99 
However, Sheptytsky’s condemnations were purely verbal; UGCC continued to partner with 
OUN throughout the interwar period and Second World War, albeit through a strained relation.  
 OUN’s religious policies were mixed toward their support of UGCC. Religion was 
viewed as an internal matter and prompted OUN to promote freedom of worship. Faiths that 
encouraged universalism and did not actively uphold Ukrainian national identity were rejected. 
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OUN envisioned the state as a supporter of religious education, only if the religion supported 
morality that upheld state sanctity. To encourage a mutually beneficial relationship, in which 
religion could be molded to become a vehicle for national identity, OUN promised state support 
for a national church.100 Despite OUN’s aversion to proclaiming a sole religious identity, 
organizational leaders saw a pragmatic possibility in aligning with UGCC. Dontsov’s work 
Church and Nationalism pointed to a partnership between Catholicism and nationalism in 
creating the state’s future spirit. OUN member Maksym Orlyk advised in 1940 that religion 
could be united with nationalism in a dualistic combat against materialism and Communism. The 
most prominent OUN member of the Second World War, Stepan Bandera, was the son of Greek 
Catholics and concurred that the Ukrainian spirit could be successfully combined with 
Christianity.101 The relationship between OUN and UGCC was contingent on faith’s ability to 
sculpt a national spirit, cultivate morality, and act as a bulwark against competing politics.  
 UGCC’s aversion to OUN was not limited only to the use of political violence: secular 
nationalism and the political philosophy of the Ukrainian nationalists stood in contrast to 
UGCC’s Christian background. Sheptytsky’s pursuit of Christian patriotism rather than 
Ukrainian nationalism is understood as being that “our nation, the Ukrainian people, [would] 
love with Christian love more than other nations and are ready to give for it the work of one’s 
whole life and even life itself”.102 UGCC gave priority to upholding Christian values in the future 
state rather than perpetuating a secular national spirit. OUN’s placement of the nation above God 
engendered unrest from Sheptytsky, who sought an inversion in which Ukrainian’s Christian 
character would be emphasized over a constructed national mythos. Sheptytsky believed 
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nationalism “is close to paganism. In its program, instead of God, places people, visually state, 
placing its interests above all others”.103 OUN’s emphasis on Ukraine’s struggle to form a state, 
and promotion of purely temporal interests, clashed with the Christian worldview of UGCC.  
 Attempts were made by Christian and nationalist thinkers to synthesize UGCC and OUN 
platforms to allow for a coherent relationship. Konstantyn Chekhovych, a Greek Catholic 
scholar, attempted to reconcile religion and nationalism as a necessity before the true formation 
of a strong Ukrainian identity. Another Christian nationalist, Father Dzerovych, sought a 
Christian nationalist ideology as the only strong solution against the tide of Communism. The 
publication of Nationalism and Catholicism by Mykola Konrad in 1934 allowed for an increase 
of popularity for Christian nationalism. Konrad argued that despite nationalism’s secular nature 
and placement of man above God, Christianity must coexist and align with nationalist endeavors 
due to their mutual hatred of Communism. Konrad also advocated for nationalism due to its 
rejection of unbridled capitalism, which subverted religious norms and degraded traditions. The 
similar ethos of nationalism and Christianity, Konrad contended, could unite into a political and 
religious force against oppositional forces.104 The convenient arrangement of UGCC and OUN 
against Communism was riddled with fundamental disagreements that hamstrung efforts to fully 
synthesize toward the Ukrainian national ideal.  
The Second World War  
 This section argues that the Second World War ended any potential political synthesis of 
religio-national aims within the Ukrainian independence movement. The dual assaults of 
Germany and the Soviet Union on Ukraine were causal components of the collapse of OUN’s 
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internal coherence into distinctive camps, while UGCC was dismissed as a political force due to 
a changing leadership hierarchy and repression from German occupiers. Arrests, persecution, and 
the ultimate annexation of Ukraine by the Soviet Union disrupted the already-tenuous 
relationship between OUN and UGCC. With the end of the Second World War, OUN and 
UGCC’s relationship ended due to disintegrating interest in Ukrainian statehood and a massive 
loss of political capital for both organizations. 
The outbreak of World War II into eastern Europe readjusted the delicate balance that 
bound UGCC and OUN toward their similar goals and caused a territorial realignment that 
removed Polish power in Galicia. The rise of National Socialist Germany during the 1930’s 
offered a key source of support for OUN: Colonel Konovalets used contacts within the German 
intelligence agency to extract material support and training, particularly in 1939. Germany’s 
invasion of Poland and promise to avoid the Soviets through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact raised 
OUN hopes of forming a breakaway Ukrainian state.105 However, the German reversal of 
Molotov-Ribbentrop in 1941 upset OUN’s strategy, forcing Ukrainian nationalism to encounter 
two opposing forces on Galician territory: the expansionary German invasion and the eternal foe, 
Communist Russia. OUN’s alignment during World War II would define the future of the 
Ukrainian nation.  
 However, OUN did not muster a unified front through which Ukrainian nationalist 
interests could be pursued because of a persistent generational gap and political stance toward 
radicalism. While older members of OUN typically desired a moderate and pragmatic path 
toward independence, the youth wing’s disillusion with the rapidity of nationalist progress 
inspired an attraction to violent revolution. This split caused a deep fracture within OUN. Under 
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the leadership of Stepan Bandera, the youth wing of OUN formed a separate, breakaway 
organization in 1941: OUN-B. The moderate members of OUN formed OUN-M, led by Andriy 
Melnyk. Due to their support among Ukrainian youth, OUN-B gained an upper hand as the most 
prominent nationalist group.106 Both groups sought Ukrainian independence, albeit through 
separate means. The split of OUN into separate groups harmed the ability of Ukrainian 
nationalists to assert power, having reached internal crisis.  
 The invading German forces in Galicia were viewed as liberators by OUN-B/M, eliciting 
an eager partnership. In June of 1941, during the beginnings of the German-Soviet conflict, 
OUN-B/M members emphasized to Adolf Hitler their desire for national independence and hope 
for cooperation. German successes in Galicia against the Soviets gave Ukrainian nationalists a 
firm belief in the eventual formation of their own sovereign state. The Ukrainian National 
Assembly passed the Proclamation of June 30th, which affirmed a commitment toward the 
formation of the Ukrainian state following the conclusion, and supposed success, of the German 
invasion. However, OUN-B/M’s naivety toward German intentions was realized quickly: 
Commissar Erich Koch, the German provincial leader established in Ukraine, dismissed notions 
that Germany was concerned about Ukrainian freedom.107 Germany’s primary political desire in 
Ukraine was the establishment of Galicia as a colony, in which German leadership would retain 
administrative capability.108 Without German support of Ukrainian statehood, nationalist groups 
began to resist their new occupiers.  
 Beginning in July 1941, OUN-B members began to view their German occupiers with 
hostility. Stepan Bandera’s arrest on July 7th, 1941 by German paramilitary forces gave impetus 
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for OUN-B to initiate armed revolt. Viewed as a source of instability and potential leader of a 
nationalist uprising, Germany detained Bandera in Berlin. OUN-B’s new leader, Mykola Lebed, 
reaffirmed his faction’s resistance to German occupation in September 1941. Around forty 
publishers of nationalist literature were executed by Germany in December 1941. OUN-B’s plea 
in April 1942 to maintain the goal of Ukrainian independence caused German administrators to 
order the arrest of all OUN-B members. Having seen the treatment of their revolutionary wing, 
OUN-M joined the resistance to German occupation in May 1942.109 The repression of OUN-B 
and late turn of OUN-M debilitated the ability of Ukrainian nationalists to properly respond to 
the German invasion between 1941 and 1942.  
 While nationalist groups struggled to confront Germany, UGCC faced political 
repression and an inability to properly ingratiate itself into the nationalist conversation. Initially, 
Sheptytsky showed strong support for OUN-B’s revolutionary message. Sheptytsky welcomed 
the Germans as liberating forces, ordering German flags to be hung at UGCC churches.110 After 
discovering the betrayal of Germany regarding Ukrainian independence, Sheptytsky desired a 
unification of Ukrainian nationalism. On July 7th, 1941, Sheptytsky pled with Melnyk to 
reconcile OUN-M and OUN-B. However, with the arrest of Bandera and lingering ideological 
divisions, Melnyk never responded to Sheptytsky’s appeals.111 UGCC’s nationalist sidelining 
was compounded by a German disdain for the Greek Catholic’s harboring of Ukrainian national 
identity. Germany favored Ukrainian Orthodoxy, allowing Orthodox churches to open and use 
Ukrainian in their sermons. Germany persecuted Catholicism throughout Ukraine, closing 
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churches and killing seventeen priests in western Volhynia.112 The death of Sheptytsky on 
November 1st, 1944, removed the strongest advocate for Ukrainian independence from the 
church’s ranks.113 UGCC lost political power throughout World War II, becoming a marginal 
actor in the wartime nationalist movement.  
 The eventual reconciliation of OUN-B and OUN-M in the latter years of World War II 
allowed for a unified response to the wrestled occupation of western Ukraine by Germany and 
the Soviet Union. At the Third Extraordinary Congress of 1943, some Ukrainian nationalists 
condemned OUN-B and associated Banderite organizations.114 OUN-B underwent leadership 
changes throughout 1943 given the strong repression of their revolutionary elements by the 
Germans.115 Both factions consented to the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), 
which combatted the Soviets and Germans through guerrilla warfare. By 1944, UPA had around 
30,000 soldiers.116Although primarily controlled by OUN-B members, UPA effectively corralled 
Ukrainian nationalists into an organized fighting force. UPA’s eastward direction gave primacy 
to the defeat of Communism throughout Ukraine, but the group resisted German dominance.117 
Soviet officials, party members, and military targets were primary targets during the latter years 
of World War II. UPA engaged in community service projects and gave material assistance to 
fellow Ukrainians to build a shared identity and garner a broader base of support. UPA, led by 
Bandera following his 1944 release from Germany, was responsible for the massacre of Poles 
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throughout eastern Galicia to attempt to rid Ukraine of foreign groups. Around 10,000 people 
were the victims of UPA’s aggressive tactics.118 Soviet collaborators, despite being ethnically 
Ukrainian, were also killed indiscriminately.119 The embattled historical legacy of UPA 
highlights the ambiguity through which Ukrainians understood their battle for independence in 
World War II: western Ukrainians were typically supportive of UPA, while eastern Ukrainians 
shuddered at the brutality of the group.  
 The end of World War II cemented the fate of Ukrainian nationalism. With the collapse 
of Germany and victory of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, Ukraine was incorporated into 
the Soviet structure in the immediate postwar years. The annexation of Ukraine by the Soviet 
Union allowed the formal creation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1945.120 The 
state of the Ukrainian nationalist movement appeared bleak: with UGCC gutted by years of 
German repression and the loss of Sheptytsky, UPA remained the main source of resistance to 
Soviet occupation. OUN was internally weak due to divisions over the leadership of Bandera and 
ideological disputes regarding the merits of fascism or democracy. With the end of the Second 
World War, Ukrainian nationalism found itself in a weaker position than the interwar period.  
The Decline of Ukrainian Nationalism  
 This section argues that the destruction of UGCC at the L’viv Synod and UPA’s political 
alienation of the Ukrainian people extinguished the remnant of a religio-national identity. The 
forced conversions of UGCC into Russian Orthodoxy by Soviet occupiers, coupled with the lack 
of political capital exercised by the resulting Catacomb Church, abolished the potential for Greek 
Catholic involvement in the Ukrainian political system. Offshoots of OUN lacked a religio-
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national bond, and often did not focus on achieving independent Ukrainian statehood. Following 
the Second World War, OUN and UGCC’s relationship completely dissolved without ever 
achieving a synthesis of political aims.  
The annexation of Ukraine by the Soviet Union further hindered the potentiality of a 
religio-national identity due to Soviet religious guidelines. The Stalinist regime developed a 
religious policy based on enlightened atheism by 1941 and support for the Russification of 
existing institutions. Religious institutions based on a particular nationality, such as the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church and Belorussian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, 
were disbanded by the Soviet Union. Orthodoxy in Ukraine was quickly russified and engulfed 
into the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church,121 thus allowing for greater Soviet control. 
Postwar Soviet religious repression of certain churches relied on several factors: size and 
influence, national allegiance, behavior and support during World War II, and ethnic 
composition.122 Soviets gave preferential treatment to Orthodox religions, due to their 
convertibility to Moscow patriarchate control, and atheist movements due to its compatibility 
with Communist thought. Catholic groups, including Polish Catholics and Ukrainian Greek 
Catholics, were harshly treated due to their connection to the Vatican and ethno-religious 
symbolism. In particular, UGCC’s alignment with Germany during World War II allowed the 
Soviets to accuse the church of treason.123 The nature and actions of UGCC in the interwar 
period and World War II made the Greek Catholics a target for Soviet repression.  
                                                           
121 The Russian Orthodox Church was dominated by Soviet loyalists by the end of the interwar period. The 
destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church accompanied a forced conversion to the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, which channeled the unique identity of the autocephalous church into 
Soviet purview.  
122 Pedro Ramet. “The interplay of religious policy and nationalities policy in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe”. 
In Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European Politics, edited by Pedro Ramet, 2nd edition (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989), 9.   
123 Vasyl Markus. “Religion and nationalism in Ukraine.”. In Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern 
European Politics, edited by Pedro Ramet, 2nd edition (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989),  
48 
 
 The four million Greek Catholics, spread across 4,119 churches in Ukraine in the 
immediate postwar years, faced an existential challenge given Soviet control of religious 
affairs.124 Having faced deportations and exterminations by the invading Soviet army during 
World War II, UGCC weakened considerably.125 The Soviet Union attempted to subvert the 
Greek Catholic Church during World War II. Renegade UGGC priest Havryil Kostelnyk, who 
advocated for a break between UGCC and Roman communion, was fully supported by the 
Soviets to cause internal instability within the church. Having failed to undermine UGCC during 
World War II, the postwar era allowed full Soviet infiltration of the church. By the spring of 
1945, the Soviets began to pressure Greek Catholic laity to voluntarily convert to Orthodoxy. On 
April 11th, 1945, Soviet security forces arrested the UGCC leadership hierarchy and sentenced 
them to forced labor for treason in allying with Germany. The Soviets recognized Kostelnyk as 
the new leader of UGCC due to his advocacy of a merger with the Russian Orthodox Church 
(ROC). A new clergy, composed of pro-Soviet priests and supported by ROC, agitated for a 
union between UGCC and the Orthodox community. UGCC clergy were forced to attend 
conferences organized by Soviet officials, as the pro-Soviet component gained increasing 
prominence: 49% of UGCC clergy were aligned with Moscow.126 UGCC transformed from a 
hotbed of Ukrainian national identity to a Soviet-controlled organization.  
 The destruction of UGCC occurred between March 8th to 10th, 1946 during the L’viv 
Sobor. Having firmly subverted the nationalistic UGCC, the Soviet Union aroused sufficient 
sympathy to the cause of Orthodox union. The L’viv Sobor liquidated UGCC and forcibly 
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converted its members to Orthodoxy. The practice of Greek Catholicism was banned by Soviet 
authorities: the use of Greek Catholic rites and proselytizing were forbidden.127 UGCC churches 
were converted to Orthodox churches. Pope Pius XII expressed sorrow for the destroyed Greek 
Catholic Church in a 1946 address, condemning the forceful conversion of believers by the 
Soviets,128 but the Vatican was slow to bring international attention to the plight of UGCC. Some 
Greek Catholics easily converted to Orthodoxy due to the shared roots and traditions of the 
faiths; others did so as a method of escaping further persecution by the Soviets.129 However, 
other Greek Catholics refused to convert to Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy’s connection to Moscow and 
the nationalist history of UGCC could not be reconciled. For many Ukrainian nationalists within 
UGCC, union with the Russian enemy was impossible.130 Animosity toward the pro-Soviet wing 
of UGCC caused dissidents to assassinate Kostelnyk for treason in September 1948. The end of 
UGCC’s official existence drove the faith underground.  
 The disbandment of UGCC led the now-dissident faith to form a “Catacomb Church” that 
perpetuated Greek Catholicism. The Catacomb Church was the largest banned religious group in 
the Soviet Union. Many clergy and laity that had been imprisoned by the Soviets in the 
immediate postwar years returned during the 1950’s to form experienced leadership and carry 
out rites for the Church. The Catacomb Church operated secretly in converted Orthodox 
churches or in private homes. The Church had around 300 priests. However, these priests were 
subject to Soviet harassment: the arrest of Vasyl Velychkovsky in 1969 and three Catacomb 
priests in 1973 who distributed Greek Catholic prayer books highlighted the repression.131 The 
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Ukrainian Herald, a dissident newspaper, provided support for the Catacomb Church and 
highlighted Soviet abuses. Father Budzynsky, a Greek Catholic priest, maintained criticism of 
the L’viv Synod throughout the postwar era.132 However, the Catacomb Church could not muster 
the same volume of nationalist agitation as UGCC. Greek Catholics, despite being banned in 
Soviet Ukraine, found sources of resistance.  
 While the Soviets liquidated UGCC, the continued existence of violent nationalist 
organizations plagued the pacification of Ukraine throughout the postwar era. UPA remained 
active, responding to Soviet repression through targeted violence. The spread of farm 
collectivization in Ukraine signaled to UPA the forced capitulation of the peasantry to the 
Soviets. UPA attacked collectivized farms, causing extensive violence, and attempted to sway 
Ukrainian peasants to revolt against the Soviets. However, the usage of violence by UPA 
alienated the peasantry and caused many civilians to view Soviet control as an acceptable 
alternative. Thus, with collectivization spurred by Soviet officials who acknowledged its 
neutering nationalist effect, support for UPA collapsed among the general public.133 UPA soon 
withered. 
 The legacy of OUN and UPA in the fight for Ukrainian independence was carried by 
offshoot organizations that resisted Soviet rule. However, these organizations rarely operated 
alongside religious institutions. The Ukrainian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union, operational 
between 1958 and 1961, desired Ukrainian independence but aligned with the Leninist 
movement. The Shistdesiatnyky movement championed Ukrainian language but was not 
explicitly ethno-nationalist or religious and was repressed heavily throughout the 1960’s.134 The 
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closest descendant of OUN was the Ukrainian National Front and Committee in Defense of the 
Catholic Church in Ukraine, both of which were Galician-based and prominent during the 
1970’s. However, the localized nature of these organizations and lack of mobilized support 
caused the OUN legacy organizations to collapse. Many other small nationalist groups, plagued 
by in-fighting over ideology and history, failed to materialize any wholesale changes to the 
Ukrainian postwar condition.135  
V. Conclusion 
 This research analyzed the presence of religious nationalism in Ukraine from the interwar 
to postwar era. To this end, the relationship between UGCC and Ukrainian nationalist groups 
was discussed. Using the Ukrainian case study, the following hypothesis was tested: if religious 
institutions and nationalist groups can synthesize spiritual and political aims, then religio-
nationalism can form. The analysis of the Ukrainian case provides support for this hypothesis. 
Ukrainian religio-nationalism did not exist, lingering in an undeveloped, weak, and 
uncooperative form. The failure of UGCC and Ukrainian nationalists to reach full partnership, 
and the lack of a true religious thrust to the ideal of Ukrainian independence, hindered the 
growth of religious nationalism. However, the degree of cooperation between UGCC and the 
Ukrainian nationalists showed a dim presence of religio-national identity. Particularly, 
Sheptytsky’s Christian patriotism and the numerous attempts to integrate Ukrainian nationalism 
with religion by authors such as Konrad and Chekhovych reveals the glimmer of potentiality for 
religio-national identity in Ukraine.  
 The failure of religio-national identity to fully blossom in Ukraine, beyond a basic and 
feeble growth, can be attributed to geographic and ethnographic considerations. Ukraine’s strong 
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Orthodox bastion in the east, and the inability of Greek Catholicism to fully unite Ukrainians 
under a single religious moniker, was perhaps the underlying reason for religio-nationalism’s 
absence. UGCC remained strong in western Ukraine, but ecumenical failures and 
denominational suspicions did not facilitate a single religio-national identity throughout Ukraine. 
The multilayered national identities of western and eastern Ukraine, given the presence of groups 
identifying as Polish and Russian, further harmed a unified identity formation. Polonization and 
Russophilia displaced the full formation of Ukrainian national identity. Therefore, UGCC and 
the Ukrainian nationalists did not receive unanimous support and therefore were not suitable 
vehicles for identity formation.  
 Religio-national identity struggled to fully form in Ukraine due to the insufficient 
partnership between UGCC and the Ukrainian nationalists to synthesize their spiritual and 
political aims. UGCC could not fully integrate with the Ukrainian nationalists due to their 
disagreements regarding political aims. The issue of political violence and assassinations 
perpetuated by UVO and OUN meant that UGCC did not lend full support to the organizations. 
UGCC’s condemnation of violence as a method of achieving national independence conflicted 
with the essential aims of the Ukrainian nationalists, who pursued a violent uprising against 
Poland. The assassination of Ivan Babiy by OUN emphasized the lack of cooperation between 
religion and nationalism: through the death of Babiy, a Catholic activist, OUN signaled a 
disregard for giving primary consideration to their relationship with UGCC. The strained 
relationship following Babiy’s assassination created strong tensions and revealed that the issue of 
political violence could not be reconciled. Generally, UGCC and OUN’s disagreement regarding 
violence exposes that religio-nationalist movements must agree on the issue of finding a political 
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or revolutionary solution. Therefore, a religio-national identity can not arise if unsettled 
differences exist regarding the merits of reformer or revolutionary mentalities.  
 Conceptions of nationalism were not reconciled by UGCC and the Ukrainian nationalists, 
meaning a united form of national identity could not be realized. Christian patriotism, the pet of 
Sheptytsky’s nationalist tendency, was not popular in nationalist circles. OUN, for example, 
explicitly pursued secular nationalism in achieving Ukrainian independence. Christian patriotism 
and secular nationalism was not effectively integrated through the works of Chekhovych, Orlyk, 
Konrad, and Dontsov. Despite the efforts of the intelligentsia, Christian nationalism did not 
become the vehicle for Ukrainian independence. OUN’s commitment to secularism, perhaps to 
avoid upsetting Orthodox groups or atheist elements, clashed with the commitment to spreading 
and upholding Christian values through UGCC. Spiritual values could not be aligned between 
UGCC and the Ukrainian nationalist groups due to the primacy of God or State in each 
movement. UGCC’s criticism of OUN’s placement of achieving the Ukrainian state as the prime 
directive of the movement, instead of creating a Christian state, was the main source of conflict. 
OUN, becoming itself a political religion through its stylized and unique ceremonies regarding 
national identity, did not explicitly adopt a Christian worldview. Dontsov’s Darwinistic view of 
nationhood and struggle did not reconcile with Sheptytsky’s goal of achieving a Christian state. 
The lack of a spiritual synthesis in Ukrainian nationalism shows that religio-national identities 
rely upon harmonious platforms, or negotiated compromises, to become fully achieved.  
 Beyond the explicit religio-national relationship in Ukraine, the splintering of Ukrainian 
nationalism harmed the formation of a concrete movement during the interwar and Second 
World War era. Despite the ability of the nationalists to coalesce around OUN following the 
collapse of UVO, infighting continued to burden the movement for independence. OUN’s 
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splintering into the Bandera and Melnyk camps diffused power among two oppositional groups, 
thus weakening the intensive influence wielded by the nationalists. OUN’s split between 
moderates and revolutionaries caused the Ukrainian nationalist movement to fracture and hurt its 
ability to respond to large-scale crises in a unified manner. The formation of UPA during the 
Second World War was the closest manner of nationalist reunification, but UPA’s 
ineffectiveness in rallying Ukrainian civilians through its usage of violent intimidation harmed 
viability. Additionally, UPA’s struggle in fighting both Germany and the Soviet Union caused 
issues of human capital due to the sustained losses and pronged approach that diluted UPA’s 
overall impact. The conquest of Ukraine by the Soviets sounded the end of UPA as effective 
repression and dismantling of leadership apparatuses caused the nationalist movement to fade 
into irrelevancy for the subsequent decades. Having been plagued by internal disputes and 
ultimately disbanded by the consolidation of Soviet power throughout Ukraine, the nationalist 
movement did not form a unified identity.  
 Similarly, UGCC was unable to create a lasting religio-national legacy. The death of 
Sheptytsky indicated the end of explicit nationalist support by Greek Catholic leadership. The 
rise of Polish and later Soviet apologists such as Khomyshyn further revealed UGCC’s swing 
toward reconciliation with foreign powers controlling Ukraine. The L’viv Synod of 1946, 
ushering the full destruction of UGCC, ended the ability for the church to operate openly and 
effect political change. The effective Soviet repression of Greek Catholicism, which 
acknowledged its potential as an agent for nationalist fervor, led to a weakened underground 
movement that did not have enough influence to mobilize action. The Catacomb Church allowed 
nationalist Greek Catholics to exercise dissidence against the Soviets, but it could not mount a 
dedicated challenge to the regime without legal authority to operate. Despite acting as a vehicle 
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for underground Ukrainian nationalism, the Catacomb Church did not effect wholesale change to 
the political environment. Therefore, Ukrainian religio-nationalism lacked a strong religious 
aspect following the interwar era due to the death of Sheptytsky and dissolution at the L’viv 
Synod.  
 The lack of a religio-national identity in Ukraine during these critical eras could be a 
component of the modern-day weakness of Ukrainian identity. A splintered national identity in 
Ukraine, aided by Russian intervention, contributed to the post-Euromaidan revolution in the 
east. Faced with distinct ethnicities and multilayered identities in eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian 
state did not have a unified vision of national, nor remotely religious, identity. Disputes over 
what it meant to be Ukrainian, and the validity of such an identity, led to tensions that spilled 
into armed conflict. While the strain between Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy was not a 
primary contributing factor to the ongoing conflict, it is apparent that religion lacked a strong 
identification force in modern Ukraine. Future research could examine the linkages between the 
stunted growth of Ukrainian religio-nationalism from the interwar era and the present conflict in 
eastern Ukraine. This could unveil the extent of which a lack of religio-national identity 
contributed to the weakness of modern Ukrainian nationalism.  
 In conclusion, religio-nationalism can only be formed through a synthesized spiritual and 
political platform between religion institutions and nationalist groups. Factors such as infighting 
and external repression can contribute to the degree through which each segment can represent 
their interests. Although a partnership can be achieved between religious institutions and 
nationalist groups, a fully symbiotic identity cannot be achieved without an integrated approach. 
The Ukrainian case study shows the issues that arise in attempting to formulate a religio-national 
identity. While other states have successfully integrated a religio-national identity, Ukraine’s 
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absence indicates the means through which a people cannot imbue their national identity with 
religious connotations. If a strong harmonization between religious institutions and nationalist 
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